By John Greco
Once we verify (or deny) that somebody understands whatever, we're creating a worth judgment of varieties - we're claiming that there's anything greater (or inferior) approximately that person's opinion, or their facts, or maybe approximately them. A valuable job of the idea of data is to enquire this type of assessment at factor. this can be the 1st e-book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative measurement of information and data ascriptions, its relevant concentration. John Greco argues that wisdom is a type of success, in place of mere fortunate luck. This locates wisdom inside a broader, primary normative area. by way of reflecting on our pondering and practices during this area, it really is argued, we achieve perception into what wisdom is and what sort of worth it has for us.
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Extra resources for Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity
56–7. , p. 64. 35 Against deontology 41 cognitive transitions in a connectionist network are effected by means of sub-representational laws, there is no guarantee that those transitions will also be describable by representation-level laws. Of course there will be a cognitive transition function; that is, a function that is specifiable at the level of representations. But this function need not be specifiable in any general way at the representational level. This point is important in the context of Horgan and Tienson’s discussion because they are concerned to reject classical AI’s assumption that cognitive transitions can be physically implemented by means of representation-level rules.
Reidel, 1979). Another problem with the current objection is that it invokes a requirement that would lead to skepticism. See my “Agent Reliabilism”; and Putting Skeptics in their Place, especially Chapter 6. 10 This would explain why I have defended such a theory myself in the past. See my “Internalism and Epistemically Responsible Belief,” Synthese 85 (1990): 245–77; and “Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (1993): 413–32. 9 24 Achieving Knowledge 3 T h e a rgu m e n t ag a i ns t s t rong de on t ol o g ic a l t h e or i e s The argument in Section 2 concluded that weak deontological merit is too weak for knowledge-relevant normative status.
For example, anyone who knows the axioms of arithmetic has good reasons for believing a theorem in the system. But unless one puts two and two together, one does not believe the theorem in question on the basis of one’s good reasons. We can imagine, for example, that someone believes a true theorem for no reason at all, or even that one believes a true theorem for bad reasons. 8 The next point is that knowledge requires believing for good reasons, and not just having good reasons. Two examples illustrate this.
Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity by John Greco